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Case No. 860342-CA 
Category No. 2 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PRPCEEPJNS5 
This appeal is from the trial court's order arresting 
judgment and granting a new trial to defendant after a jury had 
convicted defendant in the Fourth Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN, 
S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah R. Crim. P. 26(c)(2) (UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 77-35-26(0(2) (1982)). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the prosecutor's 
pretrial warning to a defense witness concerning possible 
criminal liability constituted grounds for arresting judgment and 
granting defendant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Curtis Owens, was charged with theft under a 
rental agreement pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-404 and -410 
(1978) (R. 26). After a jury found defendant guilty of the 
charged offense, the trial court, upon defendant's motion, 
arrested judgment and ordered a new trial (R. 61, 116-22). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Crim. P. 23: 
At any time prior to the imposition ot 
sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion ot a defendant shall, 
arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, 
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is 
other good cause for the arrest of judgment. 
Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless 
a judgment of acquittal of the offense 
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, 
order a commitment until the defendant is 
charged anew or retried, or may enter any 
other order as may be just and proper under 
the circumstances. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24: 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party 
or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made 
in writing and upon notice. The motion shall 
be accompanied by attidavits or evidence of 
the essential facts in support of the motion. 
If additional time is required to procure 
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone 
the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made 
within 10 days after imposition of sentence, 
or within such further time as the court may 
fix during the ten day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party 
shall be in the same position as if no trial 
had been held and the former verdict shall 
not be used or mentioned either in evidence 
or in argument. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(c): 
(c) An appeal may be taken by the 
prosecutor: 
(1) From a final judgment of 
dismissal; 
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(2) From an order arresting judgment; 
(3) From an order terminating the 
prosecution because ot a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(4) From a judgment of the court 
holding a statute or any part thereof invalid; 
or 
(5) From an order of the court 
granting a pre-trial motion to suppress 
evidence when, upon a petition for review, the 
supreme court decides that such an appeal 
would be in the interest of justice* 
standard 3-3.2(b), A.B.fl, standards for Criming! 
Justice: 
Whenever a prosecutor knows or has reason 
to believe tnat the conauct of a witness to 
be interviewed may be the subject ot a 
criminal prosecution, the prosecutor or the 
prosecutor's investigator should advise the 
witness concerning possible self-incrimi-
nation and the possible need for counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 29, 1986, defendant entered into a rental 
agreement for a television set with the Curtis Mathes outlet in 
Orem, Utah. That agreement called for monthly installments of 
thirty-two dollars and contained a clause that allowed defenaant 
to terminate the agreement upon proper notice. In early October 
1986, having not received the September payment on the television 
from defendant, Curtis Mathes attempted to contact defendant, 
only to discover that he had moved and apparently taken the 
television with him. On October 16, Curtis Mathes turned the 
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matter over to the Orem Police Department. Affidavit of Steve 
Wright (R. 92-93).X 
According to defendant, in September 1986 he gave 
Lawrence Hamilton, his roommate, sixty-five dollars to pay to 
Curtis Mathes for the September and October 1986 installments on 
the television rental contract* Defendant stated that he never 
told Hamilton the money was for a phone bill and that he neither 
owed Hamilton money nor told him the sixty-tive dollars was 
payment for such a debt. Affidavit of Curtis Owens (R. 89). 
During conversations with defendant's attorneys prior 
to trial, Hamilton acknowledged that he had received sixty-five 
dollars from defendant for payment to Curtis Mathes on the 
television rental contract, but that he did not give the money to 
the store and instead used it for his own purposes. Hamilton 
indicated that he would testify accordingly at defendant's trial. 
Attidavit of James P. Rupper (R. 111-12); Atfidavit of Collin 
Winchester (R. 113) . 
At trial, Hamilton gave the following pertinent 
testimony on direct examination by defendants attorney: 
Q: Do you know the defendant, Curtis Owens? 
1
 This brief's statement of facts is derived primarily from the 
artidavits attached to defendant's post-trial motion and the 
response to it filed by the State. The trial court relied 
heavily on those atfidavits in rendering its decision to arrest 
judgment and to grant defendant a new trial. 
Although Mr. Wright, a co-owner of the Curtis Mathes store, 
gave additional testimony in his affidavit concerning defendant's 
efforts to rectify the problem with his bill (R. 42-43), tnat 
evidence apparently was not presented at trial and is not 
critical to this appeal. gee Memorandum of Defendant (R. 83-84); 
Memorandum ot State (R. 97-98) . 
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Yes, I do. 
When did you f i r s t meet Mr. Owens? 
I met Curtis about tnree years ago. 
And was there a time when you were 
[ C l u r t i s ' s roommate? 
Yes, there was. 
When did that occur? 
The first time was in June of 1984 when 
we resided in the Continental Apartments. 
And again at the Seville Apartments from 
August to about early October. 
Of what year? 
Of 1986. 
While you were residing in the Seville 
apartments with Curtis as your roomraatef 
do you recall a color television—a 
Curtis-Mathes Color Television being in 
the apartment? 
Yes, I do. 
Who brought that television into the 
apartment? 
Curtis did. 
Did he tell you that he was leasing the 
TV? Did he tell you that he owned the 
TV? 
He told me that he was renting it from 
Curtis-Mathes, yes. 
Did Curtis ever leave town for a while 
while you were his roommate? 
Yes, he did. 
Do you know approximately when that was? 
No, I don ' t . 
Prior to his leaving town, did he give 
you any money? 
-5-
Yes, he did. 
Do you know the amount thereof? 
Somewhere between forty-five and sixty 
dollars, somewhere therein. 
Did he give you any instructions as to 
what to do with that money? 
Some money was what he owed me, and I was 
supposed to pay a bill for it with the 
money that he gave me, yes. 
Did he tell you which bill you were 
supposed to pay with the money? 
Not specifically. I remember we did have 
a phone bill that had to be paid, though. 
Did you, in fact, pay that phone bill? 
No, I didn't. 
What did you do with the money? 
I took the money and kept it because most 
of it was owed to me. 
Did Curtis ever tell you, "Hey, this is 
the money I owe you?" 
He just asked me about the bill, and that 
was it. And I asked him which one. 
Did he give you any indication that you 
were free to spend that money? 
Well, I was under the assumption that 
since he owed me a majority of it, I was 
free to do so. 
Did Curtis tell you it was okay to spend 
it and not pay it on the loan? 
No, he didn't. 
Did you ever pay Curtis-Mathes anything 
on the money Curtis owed them? 
No, I didn't. I never knew anything 
about Curtis-Mathes as far as a bill 
being concerned. He may have brought it 
up tnat he owed money to them, but not 
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that I was supposed to specifically pay a 
bill to Curtis-Mathes. 
Q: How long were you Mr. Owen's [rJooramate? 
A: For approximately two months. 
Q: Which one of you moved out? 
A: He moved out before I did. 
Q: And [at] that time did he take the 
television with him? 
A: The television—if I remember correctly, 
the television was still in the 
apartment. I can't recall for sure what 
happened to it. 
Q: You don't know whether he took it with 
him? 
A: Nof because he left two days before I did 
and he still had stutf in the apartment. 
(T. 2-5) .2 
However, in his post-trial affidavit, Hamilton stated: 
1. I gave testimony at the trial of 
Curtis Owens on April 28, 1987. I feel I was 
deterred in giving my complete knowledge of 
the facts of this matter because of 
intimidating remarks made to me by the 
prosecution prior to trial and because 
Curtis'[s] lawyer did not ask me more 
specific questions regarding my knowledge ot 
these events. 
2. On either April 23 or 24, 1987 upon my 
arriving home from work, I found a message 
for me taken by a roommate which instructed 
me to call Snerry Ragan at the Utah County 
Attorneys Office at 373-0136. 
3. I dialed this number and after 
identifying myself to the individual who 
answered, I stated I was returning Sherry 
Ragan's call. 
"T." reters to the partial transcript of the trial that has 
been filed on appeal. 
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4. An individual then came on the phone 
and identified herself as Sherry Ragan and 
thanked me for returning her call. 
5. She stated tnat she was calling about 
the Curtis Owens matter and then asked me[#] 
"Did Curtis Owens give you money for the 
Curtis Math[e]s bill?" 
6. Before I could answer the question, 
she followed it up with "and if he did and 
you didn't pay the bill, you can be cnarged 
with theft." 
7. I asked what she meant by I could be 
charged with theft? 
8. She replied if Owens gave me money 
specitically for the Curtis Mathtels bill and 
I didn't use the money for that purpose, that 
is theft. 
9. A theft charge was the last sort of 
problem I needed. 
10. Curtis Owens gave me $60 to $65 
sometime during September, 1986, which was on 
the day Curtis left on a trip for Idaho. 
11. I knew about the Curtis[-]Mathes bill 
and a phone bill owed by Curtis as we were 
roommates. 
12. On the morning ot the day Curtis gave 
me the money, we talked about these bills as 
well as the fact that Curtis owed me $45. 
13. When Curtis gave me the money, I 
vaguely remember him stating sometning to the 
effect "this is for the bill." 
14. It is very possible Curtis may have 
said this is for the Curtis Math[e]s bill or 
whatever but frankly I was very busy that 
day[;] Curtis at times was very dirticult to 
understand because ot his speech impediment 
and I may not have been paying much attention 
to what he was saying. 
15. I applied $45 of the money towards 
what Curtis owed me. 
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16. At the trial Curtis Owens'Is] lawyer 
never asked me questions that would have 
allowed me to fully explain this matter and 
as I have already stated, I was fearful 
because of the prosecution*s statements 
towards me. 
(R. 86 -88 ) . In her p o s t - t r i a l a f f i d a v i t , the prosecutor. Sherry 
Ragan, seated: 
2 . On or about April 23 , 1987, I spoke 
with a person who i d e n t i f i e d himself as 
Lawrence Hamilton by phone. 
3 . Mr. Hamilton had returned my c a l l to 
his apartment e a r l i e r the same day. 
4. At the time I spoke to Mr. Hamilton I 
had been informed that Mr. Hamilton was to be 
a witness in the above-ent i t l ed matter which 
was scheduled for t r i a l on April 28, 1987. 
5. I had further been informed by 
Defendant's attorney that Mr. Hamilton's 
testimony would be different than his 
previous statements to the complaining 
witness, Ralph Wright. 
6. When I spoke to Mr. Hamilton he very 
emphatically told me that Curtis Owens had 
owed him money and that money was owed on 
several bills including the rent, phone bill 
and utilities. 
7. I told Mr. Hamilton that I had been 
told tnat he was going to say that Curtis 
Owens had given him the money, $65.00, for 
specific purpose of taking the money to 
Curtis Math[e]s to pay that bill and that 
after receiving the money he decided to not 
pay Curtis's bill but to use the money for 
his own use. (Curtis Owens!fs] testimony at 
preliminary hearing dated January 20, 1987.) 
I told Mr. Hamilton that if this was his 
testimony he would be admitting to thett and 
tnat he might want to talk to an attorney 
before he testified. 
8. Mr. Hamilton was very quick to assure 
me that he did not know anything about the 
Curtis Math[e]s bill, just as he had told 
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Ralph Wright [co-owner of the Curtis Mathes 
outlet in Orem] and tnat the money was given 
to him to pay on bills and to pay him what 
Curtis owed him. 
9. After speaking to Mr. Hamilton I told 
the Defendant's attorney of my conversation 
with Mr. Hamilton. 
10. It was not my intention to try to 
intluence Mr. Hamilton's testimony but to 
find out what his testimony would be and to 
caution him, if necessary, of the possible 
implications ot his testimony. 
11. Mr. Hamilton was very anxious to tell 
me that he had no knowledge of the television 
or the money. I did not have the impression 
that he was telling what he said because of 
any intimidation he felt from me. 
12 . Mr. Hamilton's testimony at t r i a l on 
d i r e c t examination was very similar to what 
he had told me on the phone and to what he 
had previously to ld Ralph Wright. 
(R. 101-02) . 
After the jury returned a verdict ot guilty as charged 
(R. 61), defendant filed a motion titled "Motion For Arrest Of 
Judgment Or In The Alternative For New Trial" (R. 78). In his 
supporting memoranda, defendant argued, inter alia, that he 
should receive a new trial because Hamilton, due to the 
prosecutor's statements concerning possible criminal liability 
for theft, had been intimidated into not giving the testimony at 
trial tnat he had indicated he would to defendant's attorneys 
prior to trial (R. 80-85, 103-09). After a full hearing on the 
matter, the trial court ruled that defendant was entitled to a 
new trial because the prosecutor's pretrial warning to Hamilton 
was improper and that it had a prejudicial intluence on 
Hamilton's trial testimony (R. 116-22) (Addendum). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The warning of possible criminal liability given by the 
prosecutor to a defense witness prior to trial was consistent 
with Standard 3-3.2(b), A.B.A. Standards of Criminal Justice, 
Therefore, the trial court erred in arresting judgment and 
granting defendant a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ARRESTED JUDGMENT 
AND GRANTED DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON 
THE WARNING ABOUT POSSIBLE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
GIVEN TO A DEFENSE WITNESS BY THE PROSECUTOR 
BEFORE TRIAL. 
The issue presented in this appeal is a narrow one: 
Did the trial court erroneously arrest judgment and grant 
defendant a new trial based upon its conclusion that the 
prosecutor was guilty of misconduct when she, prior to trial, 
warned a defense witness, Lawrence Hamilton, that his anticipated 
testimony might subject him to criminal liability? However, 
before addressing this issue, it is necessary to discuss briefly 
the procedural avenue followed in presenting this appeal to this 
Court. 
In a criminal case, an appeal may be taken by the 
prosecution only in certain circumstances, one of which is when 
the trial court arrests judgment. Utah R. Crim. P. 2b(c)(2) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-26(c)(2) (1982)). In the instant case, 
defendant filed a motion which he captioned as one for arrest of 
judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Tnat motion 
was filed and eventually ruled upon prior to any imposition of 
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sentence. Although in its ruling the trial court, after noting 
that defendant's motion was captioned in the alternative, stated 
that "the motion of the defendant for a new trial is well taken 
and is therefore hereby granted" (R. 116; Addendum), it in 
substance arrested judgment under Utah R. Crim. P. 23 (UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 77-35-23 (1982)) and ordered that defendant be retried 
under that rule. This is so because Rule 23 is applicable to 
post-trial motions like defendant's that are filed prior to the 
imposition of sentence. A true motion for a new trial is made 
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 24 (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-24 
(1982)) atter the imposition of sentence. See Rule 24(c). 
Therefore, the State is properly before this Court pursuant to 
Rule 26(c ) (2) on an appeal from the lower c o u r t ' s arres t of 
judgment under Rule 23. 
The trial court's ruling was based squarely on the 
conclusion that the prosecutor improperly warned Lawrence 
Hamilton that, if he testified to converting to his own use the 
money given him by defendant for payment to Curtis Mathes on the 
television rental contract, he might be liable for thett. In 
making its ruling, the court clearly accepted paragraph 7 of the 
prosecutor's affidavit as fact (R. 117-19). That paragraph 
states: 
I told Mr.Hamilton that I had been told 
tnat he was going to say that Curtis Owens 
had given him tne money, $65.00, for the 
specific purpose of taking the money to 
Curtis Mathlejs to pay that bill and that 
after receiving the money he decided to not 
pay Curtis's bill but to use the money for 
his own use. (Curtis Owensl's] testimony at 
preliminary hearing dated January 20, 1987.) 
I told Mr. Hamilton that if this was his 
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testimony he would be admitting to thett and 
tnat he might want to talk to an attorney 
before he testified. 
(R. 102). Based on this evidence, the court determined that "the 
actions of the prosecutor were improper in that it [sic] deprived 
the defendant of his right to have his defense presented by 
testimony of witnesses that would be given freely and without 
fear of prosecution for the testimony given" (R. 121). In doing 
so, it rejected the prosecutor's argument tnat her warning to 
Hamilton complied with Standard 3-3.2(b) , ABA Standards for 
Criminal Just!??, which provides: 
Whenever a prosecutor knows or has reason 
to believe that the conduct of a witness to 
be interviewed may be the subject of a 
criminal prosecution, the prosecutor or the 
prosecutor's investigator should advise the 
witness concerning possible self-incrimi-
nation and the possible need for counsel. 
The court stated: 
The above standard [3-3.2(b)] appears to be 
postured in respect to witnesses contacted by 
the State in the course of investigating a 
matter when the conduct of a prospective 
witness "may be the subject of a criminal 
prosecution", is prior to the filing of a 
charge a [sic] preliminary hearing or 
indictment and would not apply to this case 
since the advise [sic] was just a few days 
prior to trial. At this particular juncture 
coming from the prosecution, the cases cited 
by counsel for tfce defendant are definitive 
as to the impropriety of that conduct. The 
cases of State Vt Peterson* 722 p.2d 768 
(Utah, 1986), United States v. Morrison, 535 
F.2d 223 (3rd Cir. 1976), United States v. 
MacClosKy. 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 198^), 
United States v. Smith* 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) would support the findings of the 
court that the conduct of the prosecutor in 
the assertions as set forth in paragraph 7 of 
her attidavit are impermissible and tnat the 
error is not harmless but in fact could have 
had a strong intluence on the verdict 
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rendered by the jury where had the testimony 
of Hamilton been given as it had been 
determined prior to the phone call the jury 
may have very well concluded that the 
defendant had no intent to steal services 
under the rental agreement but in fact had 
made arrangements that the bill be paid and 
that the decision of the witness Hamilton not 
to pay the rental bill but to pay what he 
claimed defendant owed him was the reason the 
bill went unpaid. 
(R. 121-122; Addendum). 
Although the prosecutor ' s warning may have influenced 
Hamilton's t r i a l test imony, that fac t i s not f a t a l to the S t a t e ' s 
c a s e . Holbert v. United S t a t e s . 513 A.2d 825, 82b-28 (D.C. App. 
1986) . The warning given was in l i n e with Standards 3 - 3 . 2 ( b ) , 
unaer which the prosecutor had an e t h i c a l ob l iga t ion to inform 
Hamilton of poss ib l e criminal l i a b i l i t y through s e l f -
incrimination and to advise him of the p o s s i b l e need for counse l . 
Id.» at 827. The h is tory of Standard 3-3.2(b) makes t h i s c l e a r : 
In the first edition, paragraph (b) stated 
that "it is proper but not mandatory" for a 
prosecutor to advise a witness of the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the 
possible need for counsel when there is 
reason to believe the witness may be 
subjected to criminal prosecution. This has 
been changed to provide tnat a prosecutor 
should give such advisements whenever 
criminal prosecution of the witness is 
considered possible. 
I ABA Standards for Criminal Justice S 3-3.2, at 41-42 (2d ed. 
Supp. 1986). The commentary to 3-3.2(b) further explains: 
Prosecutors and their investigators 
obviously should warn witnesses of the right 
to a lawyer and to remain silent if the 
circumstances of the questioning constitute 
custodial interrogation. Paragraph (b) deals 
with situations where custodial interrogation 
is not present. However, prosecutors and 
their investigators cannot conceal 
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information concerning law violations that 
come to their attention. Essentially, they 
occupy a position like that of police 
otficers, but without custody of witnesses: 
inadvertent disclosures may be admitted 
against witnesses, should they later be 
charged. Given the difficulty ot predicting 
the course of future judicial action, and in 
fairness to the person interviewed, it is 
recommended that prosecutors and their 
investigators warn potential defendants of 
the privilege against self-incrimination and 
the possible need for counsel. 
i£., at 42. And even though the prosecutorfs warning did not 
pertectly track the language of $ 3-3.2(b), it adequately 
communicated the essence of the standard. Significantly, the 
Utah Supreme Court has relied on the ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice for guidance in deciding the appropriateness of 
particular conduct in criminal proceedings. See. e.g.# State v. 
RJChflldS/ 740 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1987); State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 
1294, 1300-01 (Utah 1986); Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 345 
(Utah 1980). 
The trial court's conclusion that § 3-3.2(b) did not 
apply to a prosecutor interviewing a witness after the filing of a 
charge and shortly before trial simply is not supported by a plain 
reading ot the standard. A reasonable reading of § 3-3.2(b) 
indicates that it applies to all stages of the criminal process, 
including the trial stage. Holbert, 513 A.2d at 827. Furthermore, 
United States v. Morrison. 535 F.2d 223 (3rd. Cir. 1976), and 
United States v. Smith. 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973)—cases cited 
by tne trial court to support its decision—are distinguishable 
from the instant case, in that they plainly involved a tnreat of 
prosecution whicn was calculated to make the potential defense 
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witness an unwilling witness* Admittedly, United States v. 
MacCloskey. 682 F.2d 468, 479 (4th Cir. 1982), provides stronger 
support for the court's ruling; however, given the "eleventh hour" 
timing of the prosecutor's warning and the context in which it was 
given, it carried an implicit threat of prosecution which appeared 
to be intended to cause the witness to refrain from testifying. In 
defendant's case, the prosecutor's warning was given in the context 
of investigating a defense witness's anticipated testimony and was 
not, as testified to by the prosecutor, intended to influence or 
intimidate the witness. The warning was clearly offered in an 
effort to comply with Standard 3-3.2(b). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, the trial court's 
order arresting judgment and granting a new trial should be 
reversed. /] 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 day of November, 
1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPS 
Assistant Attorney General 
* ^ W ^ 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
STATE OF UTAH, ) Case Number CR 87 31 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) RULING 
CURTIS OWENS, ) 
Defendant. ) 
******** 
This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion 
to Arrest Judgment or for a new trial. Memorandum have been 
submitted by counsel on both sides, and the court granted oral 
argument and after a consideration of the foregoing has concluded 
that the motion of the defendant for a new trial is well taken 
and is therefore hereby granted. 
The principal error assigned to the State in presenting 
this case has to do with a conversation between the prosecutor 
and a witness who had agreed to testify for the defendant. This 
witness, Lawrence Hamilton, had been contacted after the 
preliminary hearing by James Rupper then counsel for defendant 
who by affidavit asserted that he had talked to Hamilton about 
him having received $65.00 from defendant to pay on the rental 
account of the defendant in issue in this case. Hamilton told 
Rupper that he had received the money to be applied on the rental 
account but used it for other purposes and that Hamilton owed the 
1 
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defendant that amount of money. Hamilton further indicated his 
willingness to testify in court in behalf of defendant Owens. 
This matter was staffed by the public defender's office (where 
Rupper is employed), and it was determined they would continue 
representing Owens. At a later date Owens secured the services 
of another attorney (Winchester) and asked the public defenders 
to withdraw. 
The newly engaged counsel Colin Winchester filed his 
affidavit which account of interviewing Hamilton on April 20, 
1987, was essentially the same as that of Rupper to the effect 
that approximately $64.00 was received by him from defendant for 
the purpose of paying the rental bill. Winchester so advised 
County Attorney Ragan on the same day. Winchester was present 
when a subpoena was served upon Mr. Hamilton by a process server 
on the 27th of April at which time Mr. Hamilton reported to him 
that a Deputy Utah County Attorney prosecuting this case called 
him and asked him about his testimony and told him he could be 
criminally liable for theft if he accepted Owens* money and did 
not apply it on the rental bill. 
The affidavit of Sherry Ragan admits that on or about 
April 23 she spoke with Lawrence Hamilton by phone advising him 
that she had learned that he was to be a witness in the case for 
Mr. Hamilton and that his testimony would be contrary to what 
another witness, Ralph Wright, claimed he had told him. Ms. 
Ragan at paragraph 7 of her affidavit states: 
-I told Mr. Hamilton that I had been told that he 
was going to say that Curtis Owens had given him the 
money, $65.00, for the specific purpose of taking the 
money to Curtis Mathis to pay that bill and that after 
2 
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receiving the money he decided to not pay Curtis' bill 
but to use the money for his own use. (Curtis Owens1 
testimony at preliminary hearing dated January 20, 
1987). I told Mr. Hamilton that if this was his 
testimony he would be admitting to theft and that he 
might want to talk to an attorney before he testified." 
The balance of the affidavit asserts Hamilton's denial 
of any knowledge about a rental bill and merely that the money 
given to him was to pay on bills defendant owed him. 
At subparagraph 10 of the affidavit Ms. Raga^ , asserts: 
"It was not my intention to try to influence Mr. 
Hamilton's testimony but to find out what his testimony 
would be and to caution him, if necessary, of the 
possible implications of his testimony." 
The various affidavits are consistent insofar as 
material to the issue of the knowledge of defense counsel of the 
apparent recanting of the story previously told both Rupper and 
to Winchester after the April 23rd phone call. A transcript of 
the trial testimony of the witness Hamilton discloses something 
less than what the prosecutor claims was told her on April 23 in 
the telephone conversation, and the testimony the defense claimed 
had been established prior to the trial and shortly after the 
preliminary hearing through interviews with Hamilton by defense 
counsel. 
A number of decisions in the federal jurisdictions 
indicate that any kind of prosecutorial statements which would 
constitute an interference with the free presentation of 
testimony by a defendant through a witness would amount to 
prosecutorial misconduct and in some jurisdictions without more 
would require a remand for a new trial while others require that 
a canvassing of the record to determine whether the misconduct 
was harmless error is required. 
i ts 
The court could find no direct precedent in the Utah 
law on the precise conduct of counsel in this case as to whether 
it constituted misconduct to state in the manner disclosed in 
paragraph 7 of her affidavit that testimony proffered by the 
defense to be given by Hamilton would raise a question of theft 
and that he should seek counsel, and if so whether the same was 
harmful, or whether the per se rule would apply. The recent Utah 
case of State of Utah v. Gregory J. Peterson, 37 Utah Adv. Rpts. 
10 would indicate that the per se rule does not apply in Utah and 
that if the actions of the prosecutor constitute misconduct, the 
granting of a new trial would depend upon whether such error was 
or was not harmless. 
Judging by the tenor of the testimony actually given by 
Hamilton at trial, it appears that he was skirting with both 
sides statements such as, "When Curtis left town he left him 
between $45 and $60M, and his statement that "Some of the money 
was what he owed to me, and I was supposed to pay a bill for it 
with the money that he gave me, yes.M He did not remember 
specifically what bill but that they did have a phone bill that 
had to be paid. He further stated that he didn't pay the phone 
bill, but took most of the money because it was owed to him. He 
did not admit that Curtis told him that the money given to him 
was what he owed him, and he stated that he was under the 
assumption that he owed the majority of it to him and he was free 
to take it. However, the witness denied that Curtis told him it 
was okay to spend the money and not to pay the loan. Hamilton 
testified that HHe may have brought it up that he owed money to 
4 
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them (on the rental) but not that I was supposed to specifically 
pay a bill to Curtis Mathis.M 
The foregoing summary of statements made that seem to 
be a compromise between the two positions set forth in the 
affidavits. It is noteworthy that all of the foregoing 
testimony, the only testimony of Hamilton at the trial came from 
the defense examination of him, and that the State declined 
crossexamination. 
Had Hamilton testified as the defense attorneys 
indicated he had stated to them was his testimony before the 
prosecutor interviewed him the jury would have had before it the 
fact that $64.00, the amount left with Hamilton by the defendant 
was the amount that was due on the rental agreement at the time 
defendant left town and left the money with Hamilton and had the 
jury believed that a direct instruction was given to Hamilton to 
pay the amount owing on the rental bill, and Owens testimony that 
he thought he was current at the time he returned when contacted 
by the owner of the property before the charge was filed, the 
jury could have concluded that there was no intent by defendant 
to deprive the owner of his property. 
There is no question but counsel for Mr. Owens at the 
trial in examing Mr. Hamilton should have reminded him of his 
prior conversation both with him and the attorney should have 
been aware of what prior counsel (Rupper) had developed with 
regard to Hamiltonfs statements and could have done a great deal 
in bringing this theory of the case home to the jury. 
5 
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The court concludes that the actions of the prosecutor 
were improper in that it deprived the defendant of his right to 
have his defense presented by testimony of witnesses that would 
be given freely and without fear of prosecution for the testimony 
given. 
The State justifies the actions of the prosecutor and 
claims complaince with Standard 3-3.2 of the ABA's standards for 
criminal justice which at subparagraph (b) it states: 
•'Whenever a prosecutor knows or has reason to 
believe that the conduct of a witness to be interviewed 
may be the subject of a criminal prosecution, the 
prosecutor or the prosecutor's investigator should 
advise the witness against possible self-incrimination 
and possible need for counsel." 
The above standard appears to be postured in respect to witnesses 
contacted by the State in the course of investigating a matter 
when the conduct of a prospective witness "may be the subject of 
a criminal prosecution", is prior to the filing of a charge a 
preliminary hearing or indictment and would not apply to this 
case since the advise was just a few days prior to trial. At 
this particular juncture coming from the prosecution, the cases 
cited by counsel for the defendant are definitive as to the 
impropriety of that conduct. The cases of State v. Peterson, 722 
P.2d 768 (Utah, 1986), United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 
(3rd Cir. 1976), United States v. Macclosky, 682 F.2d 468 (4th 
Cir. 1982), United States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
would support the findings of the court that the conduct of the 
prosecutor in the assertions as set forth in paragraph 7 of her 
affidavit are impermissible and that the error is not harmless 
but in fact could have had a strong influence on the verdict 
6 
rendered by the jury where had the testimony of Hamilton been 
given as it had been determined prior to the phone call the jury 
may have very well concluded that the defendant had no intent to 
steal services under the rental agreement but in fact had made 
arrangements that the bill be paid and that the decision of the 
witness Hamilton not to pay the rental bill but to pay what he 
claimed defendant owed him was the reason the bill went unpaid. 
The court will have this matter on its calendar on the 
jU£ day of July, 1987, for scheduling a new trial. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this fe. day of July, 1987. 
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